Abstract: We study the corporate-loan pricing decisions of a major Greek bank during the Greek Financial Crisis. A unique aspect of our dataset is that we  observe both the interest rate  and the "breakeven rate" of each loan, as computed by the bank's own loan-pricing department (in effect, the loan's marginal cost). We document that low-breakeven-rate (safer) borrowers are charged significant markups, whereas high-breakeven-rate (riskier) borrowers are charged small and sometimes even negative markups. We rationalize this de facto cross-subsidization of riskier borrowers by safer borrowers through the lens of a dynamic model featuring depressed collateral values, impaired capital-market access, and limit pricing.

Abstract: We examine the contribution of different lending channels to the auto loan market in times of crisis. Specifically, we explore lending from traditional banks, credit unions, and finance companies (nonbanks) over the past two decades, with an emphasis on the Great Recession and the COVID-19 pandemic. We find that banks provided weak support during the pandemic, thus losing market share and continuing the trend that emerged following the Great Recession. Nonbank market share during this period grew most significantly for subprime borrowers and in counties with stronger bank dependence. Survey evidence suggests that a tightening in banks' lending standards may have contributed to this trend. These findings contrast with the experience during the Great Recession, when banks contributed the most resilient credit to the auto loan market. Our paper highlights nonbanks' increasing role in the auto loan market in times of crisis, particularly for the subprime segment.

Abstract: I study how bankruptcy law firm advertisements affect household credit, exploiting the borders of local TV advertisement media markets. I document a significant advertising effect on filing rates, and subsequently show that ad exposure is associated with better post-bankruptcy credit outcomes. I then characterize how ad-induced filers are different from existing filers in terms of case, financial, and credit variables. I find that ad-induced filers are more likely to receive a discharge, file with lawyer representation, and be first-time filers. I interpret these findings as evidence that bankruptcy law firm advertisements help mitigate under-information and stigma in bankruptcy.

Abstract: Bank failures impose significant costs across the economy. Beyond the direct costs, we document that bank failures propagate through heightened depositor price sensitivity, implying that the direct costs understate the true costs of banking crises. We show that subsequent to a bank failure, local competitor banks significantly raise their deposit rates, despite weaker deposit and lending growth. The conflicting price and quantity evidence can be rationalized by an increased price sensitivity of depositors, emphasizing the role of depositor attentiveness in amplifying the costs of bank failures. We present cross-sectional evidence consistent with a uniform increase in depositor price sensitivity as the main mechanism explaining our findings.